Western New England Law Review
Volume 7 7 (1984-1985)
Issue 2

Article 1

1-1-1984

AN ANALYSIS OF THE "NO-STRIKE
CLAUSE" IN CONTEMPORARY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Richard D. O'Connor
Frederick L. Dorsey

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Richard D. O'Connor and Frederick L. Dorsey, AN ANALYSIS OF THE "NO-STRIKE CLAUSE" IN CONTEMPORARY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 147 (1984), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/
vol7/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Volume 7
Issue 2
1984

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE "NO-STRIKE CLAUSE"
IN CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
RICHARD D. O'CONNOR·
FREDERICK

I.

L. DORSEY··

INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty-odd years, the National Labor Relations
Board 1 has, aided and abetted by arbitrators and the circuit courts,
developed at least three distinct interpretations of broad, general, no
strike language, which depend more upon the type of strike involved
than on the language used. While perhaps lengthy and somewhat re
dundant, the typical no-strike language is hardly complex:
The union agrees that it will not collectively, concertedly or individ
ually engage in or participate, directly or indirectly, in any strike,
slowdown, stoppage or any other interference with or interruption
of the work or operations of the employer during the term of this
agreement; and the employer agrees that during the term of this
agreement it will not lock out any of the employees in the bargain
ing unit covered by this agreement. 2

Its interpretation, however, has produced some of the most lengthy

* Principal, Siegel, O'Connor & Kainen, P.C., Hartford, Connecticut. Chairman,
Labor and Employment Law Section of Connecticut Bar Association 1977-78. B.S. Col
lege of the Holy Cross, 1959; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1964.
** Associate, Siegel, O'Connor & Kainen, P.C., Hartford, Connecticut. B.A. Mar
shall University, 1976; M.B.A. University of New Haven, 1978; J.D. Western New Eng
land College, 1984.
1. Hereinafter referred to in text as the "Board" or "NLRB."
2. Although it may vary from one collective bargaining agreement to another, this
language is typical in contemporary labor agreements.
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and contradictory of labor litigations. 3
Arbitrators originally construed no-strike language narrowly.4
By the early 1950s, however, the NLRB had become involved and the
Board and the courts became locked in a battle as to what it truly
means to agree not to strike.
The debate over the proper interpretation of broad no-strike lan
guage is complicated by the various environments in which the ques
tion is presented. Arbitrators, usually the initial interpreters of
contract language, operate in an informal (and legally favored) setting
in which almost any evidence is admissible. s The NLRB, which has
the power to interpret contractual language as part of its duty to en
force the National Labor Relations Act, 6 constitutes a second type of
contract interpreter. Finally, the courts join the process in deciding
whether to enforce decisions of both arbitrators and the Board, as well
as directly interpreting contracts under section 301 of the Labor Man
agement Relations Act. 7 The courts, however, are bound by more
stringent rules of evidence and case law which grant broad deference
to arbitration and Board decisions. 8
Further confusing this matter is the fact that the Supreme Court
has not ruled in a closely analogous case since 1953 9 and the proper
interpretation of that case is still being debated. lO Thus, parties are
confronted with a convoluted array of arbitral, Board, and court deci
sions which make it virtually impossible to predict accurately the legal
rights of parties who have agreed to broad no-strike provisions as part
of their labor contract.
3.
4.
5.

See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 46 (3d ed. 1973).
Id.
Id. at 254. Elkouri & Elkouri suggest:
Although strict observance of legal rules of evidence usually is not required,
the parties in all cases must be given adequate opportunity to present all of their
evidence and argument. Arbitrators are usually extremely liberal in the reception
of evidence, giving the parties a free hand in presenting any type of evidence
thought to strengthen and clarify their case.
Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). [Hereinafter referred to in text as the "Act]."
7. Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
8. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2414 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2423 (1960); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 40 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2113 (1957).
9. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432
(1953).
10. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs., Local 18, 238 N.L.R.B. 652,
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307 (1978).
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This article will explore the historic development of the interpre
tation of no-strike clauses in labor agreements, analyzing the existing
approaches in the various fora available for the resolution of contrac
tual disputes. Special attention will be given to the conflicting analyses
developed by the Board and the courts to determine the scope of broad
no-strike provisions. Finally, the authors will comment on and, ifpos
sible, synthesize these competing interpretations.

n.

ARBITRAL TREATMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES

Labor arbitrators provided the initial contractual interpretations
limiting, or entirely prohibiting, employees' right to strike during the
term of an existing collective bargaining agreement. I I The arbitral
prohibitions were implied from the very existence of the arbitration
process itself, the empl()yer's agreement to arbitrate work disputes
forcing the implication that the union would not strike until it had
utilized this contractual dispute resolution process. The implied no
strike limitations were narrowly applied to prohibit only strikes arising
out of disputes subject to the contract's grievance and arbitration pro
cedures. Limited restrictions were also placed on a union's ability to
honor "illegitimate" picket lines of another union. Where, however,
the contract contained express no-strike language, arbitrators held
that fairness arid logic required the no-strike language to be given its
plain, broad meaning, except in those cases in which strikers were mo
tivated to honor picket lines by a reasonable fear of violence. 12
The arbitration process is a simple proceeding, voluntarily chosen
by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of
their own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the
case, they agree in advance to accept as final and binding. 13 This pro
cess, which is favored by the courts as a "substitute for industrial
strife,"'4 occurs in a more informal setting than courtroom litigation
and does not require the strict observance of legal rules of evidence. 15
Under these less formal procedures, arbitrators in early decisions
implied the existence of no-strike commitments because of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate disputes under the contract. 16 Such implied no
11. For a discussion of the no-strike clause and arbitration, see ELKOURI & ELKoURI
supra note 3, at 6, 46.
12. See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
13. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 6-7.
14. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578,466 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416, 2418 (1960).
15. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 254.
16. See, e.g., Waterfront Employees Ass'n., 4 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1117, 1117-18 (Mar.
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strike clauses were given relatively narrow scope outside situations in
which there was a direct dispute between an employer and its employ
ees over the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. 17
A test of "legitimacy" developed to determine whether implied
no-strike clauses prohibited employees covered by· one collective bar
gaining agreement from observing the picket lines of employees cov
ered by another bargaining agreement, a practice known as
sympathetic or sympathy strikes. IS As articulated by Arbitrator Kerr
in Waterfront Employers' Association of Pacific Coast,19 legitimate
picket lines are those which have "grown out of a good faith labor
dispute. . . each case must be considered on its own merits and must
be judged in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances individ
ual to the case. "20
From this case-by-case analysis, several types of "illegitimate"
picket lines were identified, including "hot cargo" disputes,21 jurisdic
tional disputes,22 demonstration picket lines,23 and collusive picket
lines. 24 Hot cargo disputes, found mainly in longshoremen operations,
have been defined as "an effort to exert the pressure of obstructing
loading and unloading of vessels on the employing stevedors and ship
owners, for the purpose of assisting other crafts or unions in obtaining
what they seek from other employers."2s In such cases, the arbitrators
felt it unreasonable and not in the interest of labor or of the employ
ers 26 to disrupt the labor harmony between an employer and its em
2, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
273, 277 (Aug. 12, 1947) (Kerr, Arb.).
17. See O. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION
62 (2d ed. 1983).
18. See FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 547-49.
19. 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273 (Aug. 12, 1947) (Kerr, Arb.).
20. Id. at 274.
21. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177 (Aug.
31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) at 274.
22. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 275-76.
23. Id. at 274; John R. Evans & Co., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (Jan. 14, 1947) (Levy,
Arb.).
24. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 274-75;
But see Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5, 14-15 (Nov.
13, 1947) (Miller, Arb.) (amended 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273, Arbitrator Kerr's definition of
collusion based on the previous unreported Encinal decision of Arbitrator Morse).
25. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177, 1177
(Aug. 31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.).
26. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 275-76.
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ployees because of a dispute which involved neither of these parties. 27
A jurisdictional dispute involves two unions arguing over which
of them should represent a given group of employees. This was de
clared to be an atypical labor dispute since it involved a disagreement
between two labor factions rather than a disagreement between labor
and employer. 28 In such cases equity demanded that an employer not
be penalized for a dispute to which it was not a party.29
An example of demonstration picket lines can be found in John
R. Evans & Co., 30 in which a picket line was established by an indus
trial union to protest alleged police brutality encountered on the picket
lines of another labor organization. 31 Arbitrator Levy determined this
picket line to be illegitimate because it did not result from a dispute
between labor and any person or persons acting as an employer, but
from an attempt to protest the non-labor activities of another
organization. 32
Of particular interest in John R. Evans & Co. is the fact that the
contract contained a very broad no-strike clause separate from the
grievance procedure of the contract.
The "no-strike clause" contained in the present contract is one of
the broadest which the Chairman has seen. It is also quite plainly
and specifically worded. It would seem inescapable that a protest
walkout, although not involving any dispute with the immediate
employer and having for its purpose participation in a community
demonstration upon what the employees believe to be a vital ques
tion, comes within the purview of a contractual clause providing
that "there shall be no strikes, stoppages of work or slowdowns of
any kind whatsoever."33

Faced with one of the first reported decisions interpreting express no
strike language, Arbitrator Levy relied not only on the illegitimacy of
the picket line, but also on the plain meaning of the broad words of the
no-strike clause to prohibit concerted refusals to work, even if the re
fusals did not result from disputes between the immediate employer
and its employees. 34
The last of the early illegitimate or collusive picket lines involved
27.

Id. at 274.
Id.
29. Id.
30. 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (Jan. 14, 1947) (Levy, Arb.).
31. Id.at419.
32. Id. at 418-19.
33. Id. at 418.
34. !d.
28.
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situations in which two unions, one a party to an agreement and the
other not a party to the agreement, would decide that the nonparty
union would strike and establish picket lines which would then make
it possible for the party union to engage in a work stoppage by honor
ing the nonparty union's picket line. 35 The definition of a collusive
picket line was further clarified in a later arbitration decision amend
ing Arbitrator Kerr's award. In this subsequent Waterfront Employ
ers' Association of Pacific Coast 36 case, Arbitrator Miller stated:
[W]hile granting the longshoremen a measure of freedom from the
contractual restraint against work stoppages, to permit them to con
form to traditional union principles in observing the legitimate
picket lines of other unions, [the Encinal case] was carefully limited
against possible abuse. It was never intended to sanction such con
duct when picket lines are established as part of a collusive plan or
strategy having as one of its objects either the securing of some spe
cific gain or advantage to the longshoremen themselves, whether in
dividually or collectively as a union organization, or the use of the
economic force of the longshoremen as an aggressive weapon on
behalf of some affiliated union or group.37

According to Arbitrator Miller, a union under an implied no-strike
provision was free to observe picket lines in order to protect the gen
eral interest common to all union members to refrain from aiding an
employer to defeat the strike efforts of its employees, but not to serve
specific self-interests of the observing unions. 38
Taken as a whole, the arbitrators in these early decisions were
willing to imply no-strike prohibitions in cases where parties had
agreed to settle disputes by arbitration. The scope of such implied
provisions was limited, however, except for a few special circum
stances, to disputes between the primary employer and its employ
ees. 39 When the contract contained separate express no-strike
language, such language was interpreted rather broadly based on the
plain meaning of the language used. 4O
The use of plain language to interpret express, general no-strike
provisions is further demonstrated in New England Master Textile En
35. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 274-75.
36. 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5 (Nov. 13, 1947) (Miller, Arb.).
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 15.
39. See, e.g., Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
(Aug. 31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 9 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) at 5.
40. John R. Evans & Co., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 418.
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gravers Guild,41 in which Arbitrator Wallen accepted the company's
position that no-strike language, which read "[t]here shall be no
strikes, stoppages of work or slowdowns by the employees nor any
lockouts by the Employers during the life of this agreement," specifi
cally prohibited sympathetic work stoppages. 42 In a short opinion the
arbitrator stated: "The contract between the Guild and the United
Textile Workers forbids stoppages of work during its life. . . . In the
arbitrator's view, neither fairness nor logic supports the Union's
claim. . . ."43 Looking at nothing but the contract language itself,
then, Arbitrator Wallen had no difficulty in deciding that the union
sympathy strike violated the contract's general no-strike clause.
Later decisions, however, provided for an exception to this broad
interpretation of express no-strike language. In Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc.,44 the company claimed it could discipline sympathy strikers,
whose actions violated the contract, regardless of the employees' rea
son for honoring the stranger union's picket line. 45 Arbitrator Maggs
found the no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agree
ment to prohibit employees from honoring picket lines established by
other unions but he also found that the employer was not allowed to
discipline employees who honored such picket lines if the employees
were motivated by reasonable fear of violence in crossing the line. 46
He further concluded, however, that in this particular case the em
ployees had no reason to fear for their physical safety and, therefore,
the company's discipline, though not its strict contract interpretation,
was upheld. 47
More recent arbitration decisions tend to follow the general rule
that no-strike provisions that are a part of or closely related to the
grievance procedure of the contract are similar to implied no-strike
clauses and are interpreted narrowly to proscribe only work stoppages
that arise out of disputes between the primary employer and its em
ployees. 48 Where, however, the no-strike provisions are separate from
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, the no-strike
prohibitions are interpreted broadly based on the plain language of the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
(Miller,

9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 199 (Sept. 22, 1947) (Wallen, Arb.).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 201.
22 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 761 (June 21, 1954) (Maggs, Arb.).
Id. at 762.
Id. at 765.
Id.
See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 757, 778-79 (Dec. 31, 1960)
Arb.).
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contract. 49

III.

THE BOARD'S TREATMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES

The NLRB provides a second line of authority for the interpreta
tion of express no-strike language. The results, if not the actual analy
sis, of the Board's early decisions were not substantially different from
those arrived at by arbitrators. Implied no-strike provisions were con
strued narrowly and employees were not allowed to honor "illegiti
mate" picket lines. 50 The Board, however, failed to act on its initial
opportunity to rule on whether sympathy strikes violated express no
strike provisions and decided the case on other grounds. 51 The Board
also identified a new type of strike, the unfair labor practice strike,
which it decided was not prohibited by general no-strike obligations. 52
The Supreme Court refused to enforce the Board's sympathy strike
treatment, finding that the broad no-strike provision in question pro
hibited sympathy strikes, but it accepted the Board's special treatment
of unfair labor practice strikes. 53 The Board followed the Court's lead
regarding sympathy strikes for several years before it radically
changed its position on express no-strike language based on another
doctrine developed by the Court in cases dealing with implied no
strike provisions. 54
In Rockaway News Supply Co. ,55 the Board was asked to interpret
broad no-strike provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. The
Board did not, however, deal with the contractual no-strike language
directly, but rather it concluded that the entire contract was void due
to the overbreadth of its union security clause. 56 This case becomes
important, not because of the Board's decision, but because both the
49. National Homes Mfg. Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127, 1129-30 (June 19, 1979)
(Goodstein, Arb.); Westinghouse Transport Leasing Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1210,
1213 (Dec. 7, 1977) (Sergent, Arb.).
50. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 337, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1314,
1315 (1951), enforcement denied on other grounds, 197 F.2d 111, 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119
(2d Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80-81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2432, 2436 (1953).
54. See infra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
55. 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1314 (1951), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 197 F.2d 111, 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119 (2d Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71,31
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953).
56. Id. at 337, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1315.
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court of appeals 57 and the United States Supreme Court 58 found that
the contract as a whole was not void and that the key to the question
of whether the company had committed an unfair labor practice was
the interpretation of the contract's broad no-strike provision. The
United States Supreme Court determined that the no-strike language
contained in the Rockaway News collective bargaining agreement cov
ered not only direct economic strikes against the employer but also
sympathetic strikes in support of the picket lines of another striking
union. 59
At the same time the Court was deciding that the broad no-strike
language of Rockaway News prohibited sympathy strikes, the Board
was determining whether strikes in protest over an employer's unfair
labor practices were similarly prohibited by broad no-strike language.
In Mastro Plastics Corp., 60 rendered four days after the Court's hold
ing in Rockaway News, the NLRB determined that strikes called in
protest of employer unfair labor practices were not a breach of con
tractual no-strike clauses and constituted protected, concerted activity
on the part of employees. 61
The strike in Mastro Plastics Corp. was precipitated by the com
pany's alleged discriminatory discharge of an employee because of his
organizational activities in support of the incumbent union, which the
employer was attempting to replace by means of coercive and threat
ening actions. 62 The Board determined that strikes in protest of such
serious violations of the Act by the company were not contemplated
by the employees when they agreed to the no-strike language in the
contract and, therefore, did not constitute a contractual violation. 63
The Board's decision was later affirmed by both the court of appeals64
and the Supreme Court. 65
57. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 112-13, 30 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2119, 2120 (2d Cir. 1952).
58. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 76-79, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2432, 2434-36 (1953).
59. Id. at 79-80, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436. The Court's decision will be more
fully analyzed in THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF NO-STRIKE PROVISIONS, infra notes
100-171 and accompanying text.
60. \03 N.L.R.B. 511,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1494 (1953), affd, 214 F.2d 462,34
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2484 (2d Cir. 1954), affd, 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587
(1956).
61. Id. at 515, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1495-96.
62. Id. at 512, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1494.
63. Id. at 514-15, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1495.
64. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 462, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2484 (2d
Cir. 1954).
65. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 (1956).
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For years after the decisions in Rockaway News and Mastro Plas
tics Corp., the Board used the Court's Rockaway News analysis consist
ently to hold that broad no-strike language included a prohibition of
sympathy strike activities. 66 As late as 1969 the Board, in Local
12419, International Union of District 50, United Mineworkers of
America (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 67 held that a clause forbid
ding the union to cause or permit a strike by its members prohibited a
sympathy strike. 68
In National Grinding Wheel, the company and the Mineworker's
union had separate contracts covering two different locals which rep
resented the company's employees. 69 The first local, whose contract
covered the company's production and maintenance employees, had
agreed to a no-strike clause which read: "During the term of this
agreement, the Company will not conduct a lockout at its plant, and
the Union or Local Union will not cause or permit its members to
cause any strike or slowdown, total or partial, of work at the Com
pany's plant."7o
The sister local, consisting of the company's clerical and office
workers, instituted a primary economic strike as a result of stalled
contract negotiations with the company.1 1 The majority of workers in
the production and maintenance local honored the clericals' picket
line, refusing to report to work. 72 Sixteen of the production and main
tenance workers, however, crossed the picket line and worked during
the clerical strike. 73 The union instituted charges under its internal
disciplinary procedures, resulting in fines against these sixteen individ
uals. 74 One of the individuals filed a charge with the Board against the
union, claiming that she had crossed the picket line because the no
strike provisions of the contract prohibited her from engaging in a
sympathy strike. 75 The Board's general counsel issued a complaint
against the union, alleging a violation of section 8(b)(I)(a) of the
Act.76 The Board found the union to have violated the Act and in so
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1026-27 (2d ed. 1983).
176 N.L.R.B. 628,71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1311 (1969).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628-29, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1311.
Id. at 629, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1311.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(I)(a) (1982).
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doing adopted the following statements of the administrative law
judge:
Whether they did so in furtherance of their own demands or of a
cause of the sister-local, their work stoppage suspended the con
tinuity of their operations in either instance. This stoppage of work
on their part was in the face of the language forbidding Respondent
to "cause" it or even "permit" it. . . . The basic point is that this
no-strike clause meant what it said and governed the rights and obli
gations of the union and the employees covered by [it]. . . . The
conclusion is that the work stoppage of the members, and Respon
dent's adoption of it, was no less a breach of the no-strike clause,
though done in deference to the sister-local's picket line and in fur
therance of the latter's cause, than it would have been had the con
duct been in furtherance of a direct demand of Respondent or its
members. 77
The administrative law judge, whose opinion was adopted by the
NLRB, cited the Supreme Court in Rockaway News to find, on the
basis of the plain meaning of the contractual no-strike clause, that the
union sympathy strike violated its no-strike promise. 78
By 1969, then; the Board had identified three specific types of
strike activity--economic, sympathy, and unfair labor practice-and
determined their respective relationships to broad contractual no
strike language. The primary strikes were, of course, precluded by no
strike language, as apparently were sympathy strikes. 79 Unfair labor
practice strikes, however, were an exceptional situation and the right
to engage in such strikes could be waived only if it was shown that
employees actually intended to execute such a waiver.80 These posi
tions, while somewhat distorting the plain meaning of the language of
broad no-strike clauses, are reasonable and consistent with the pur
poses of the Act. 8) These positions are also consistent with arbitral
treatment of the subject. 82 During the 1960s, however, a line of court
cases defining exceptions to the anti-injunction provisions of the Nor
77. National Grinding Wheel Co., 176 N.L.R.B. at 629-30, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1312-13 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 630, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313.
79. Id.; Redwing Carriers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546 n.5, SO L.R.R.M. (BNA), 1440
41 n.5 (1962), en/arced sub nom, Teamsters, Local 79 v. NLRB 325 F.2d 1011, 54
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2707 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 90S, 55 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3023
(1954); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. at 337,28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1315.
80. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
8!' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 11-49 and accompanying text.
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ris-LaGuardia Act 83 developed. These cases would provide the Board
with a new doctrine for interpreting no-strike language and would de
cidedly alter its position with regard to the effect of no-strike language
in sympathy strike situations.
In 1962, the Supreme Court, in Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 84 affirmed an award of damages resulting from an illegal
strike, holding that the presence of an arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement creates an implied prohibition of strikes over
matters subject to that clause, even in the absence of explicit no-strike
language.85 Such an implied no-strike obligation was necessary, ac
cording to the Court, "to promote the arbitral process as a substitute
for economic warfare."86 This doctrine, which was to become known
as the "coterminous application doctrine,"87 was the basis of the
Court's decision to allow injunctive relief to stop strikes over matters
which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate, even if the
contract did not contain an express no-strike clause. 88 In Keller-Cres
cent Co. 89 and Gary-Hobart Water Corp. ,90 the Board seized upon this
doctrine and began to apply it to sympathy strike situations in which
the no-strike provisions of the contract in question were a part of, or
closely intertwined with, the arbitration provisions of the contract.
By 1978, however, the Board was ready to expand its application
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
84. 369 u.s. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962).
85. Id. at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721.
86. Id. at 105, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2722. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81,46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416, 2418-19
(1960) (demonstrating the judicial approval of the arbitration process). Interestingly, in
Warrior & Gulf, Justice Douglas indicated, "when, however, an absolute no-strike clause is
included in the agreement, then in a very real sense everything that management does is
subject to the agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in the action it
takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes." 363 U.S. at 583, 46 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2420. While admittedly dicta of the Court, this indicates a rather broad opinion
of absolute no-strike clauses.
87. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 382, 85
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049, 2055 (1974); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 776, 113
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227, 3230 (7th Cir. 1983).
88. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721. For an analysis
of the origins of the coterminous application doctrine, see generally Ryder Truck Lines v.
Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912 (6th Cir.
1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir.
1983). For further discussion of Lucas Flour Co. see infra notes 119-123 and accompany
ing text.
89. 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 687, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201, 1202 (1975), enforcement de
nied, 538 F.2d 1291,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976).
90. 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 745, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1210, 1214 (1974), enforced, 511
F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925, 90
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975).
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of the doctrine. In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
18 v. Davis-McKee, Inc.,91 the Board made a clean break from its posi
tion in National Grinding Wheel, stating "to the extent that National
Grinding Wheel stood for the proposition that the right to engage in
sympathy strikes is waived by a union's agreement to a broad no-strike
clause, without more, it has been overruled, sub silentio, by Keller
Crescent and Gary-Hobart."92 In Davis-McKee, Inc., the Board was
faced with (1) contractual language similar to Gary-Hobart in that the
no-strike provisions were clearly intertwined with and a part of the
contractual arbitration procedure,93 and (2) facts virtually identical to
National Grinding Wheel in that the union had fined members who
had refused to participate in a sympathy strike. 94 As the concurring
opinion of member Penello clearly indicates, the Board could have ar
rived at the same decision without overturning the holdings of Na
tional Grinding Wheel. 95 The majority, however, chose to apply the
coterminous application doctrine to find that sympathy strikes would
no longer be prohibited under any circumstances by general no-strike
language. 96 It is at this point that the Board's position became incon
sistent with that of the labor arbitrators who held that general no
strike language prohibited sympathy strikes. 97 Despite its lack of ac
ceptance by several circuit courts,98 the Board's position remained un
changed until 1985. 99
IV.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF NO-STRIKE PROVISIONS

The courts orginally found that broad no-strike language prohib
ited sympathy strikes but did not prevent employees from striking in
91. 238 N.L.R.B. 652,99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307 (1978).
92. Id. at 653-54, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309.
93. Compare the contractual clauses in Davis-McKee. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. at 658 n.36,
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313 n.36 and Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. at 742-43
n.4, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1211 n.4.
94. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
95. Davis-McKee. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. at 658, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313 (Penello,
member, concurring).
96. Id. at 653-54, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308-09.
97. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
98. See Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594,
599, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912, 2916 (6th Cir. 1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d
772, 777, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227, 3230-31 (7th Cir. 1983); Amcar Div., A.C.F. Indus.
v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 566-67, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2518. 2522 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB
v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364-65, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2667 (9th
Cir. 1981); Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 457-58. 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2817,2818-19 (3d Cir. 1981).
99. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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protest of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. loo The
courts also accepted the arbitral implication of no-strike obligations
when the contract contained arbitration provisions but no express no
strike commitment. 101 Such implied obligations were, however, held
to be "coterminous" with the scope of the contract's arbitration
clause. 102 The courts found a similar limitation of no-strike clauses
when employers sought injunctions against union strike activity.103
Injunctions were allowed, notwithstanding the anti-injunction provi
sions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,I04 when the underlying dispute
was over an issue arbitrable under the provisions of the collective bar
gaining agreement. IOS The Board expanded these limited court hold
ings by applying the coterminous application doctrine to cases
interpreting express no-strike provisions. 106 Such application has been
enforced by the courts only in cases where the no-strike clause is a part
of, or closely intertwined with, the contract's arbitration provisions. 107
The courts have, however, consistently required further evidence to
show that broad no-strike language does not prohibit sympathy
strikes.
The judicial history of the interpretation of no-strike clauses has
developed into a consistent, if not entirely predictable, pattern. The
leading authorities in this area are two United States Supreme Court
cases, NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co. 108 and Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB.109 In Rockaway News, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in setting aside the
Board's order to reinstate an employee discharged for refusing, in vio
lation of the contract's no-strike provisions, to cross the picket line of
another union. 11O The Board's finding was based on its conclusion
that the collective bargaining agreement was void because of an overly
broad union security clause. I II
The Court found two problems with the Board's holding. First,
while the inclusion of an illegal provision in the contract could possi
100. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 547.
101. MORRIS, supra note 66, at 900.
102. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 62-63.
103. Id. at 436, 543-49.
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 83.
105. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17 at 543-49.
106. Id. at 62-63.
107. Id.
108. 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953).
109. 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 (1956).
110. 345 U.S. at 80-81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436.
Ill. Id. at 76, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2434.
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bly justify the Board's attempt to void the contract as to future events,
the Board could not completely ignore the contract in evaluating
events which occurred prior to holding the contract void. 112 Second,
the contract contained savings and separability clauses which provided
that only the individual sections of the contract found to be illegal
would be determined inoperative while other provisions would remain
in full force and effect. I 13
Finding that the no-strike provisions of the contract remained vi
able notwithstanding the illegality of the union security clause, the
Court then determined that the no-strike language prohibited the sym
pathy strike activities of the discharged employee and provided a de
fense to the unfair labor practice charges against the company. I 14
In Mastro Plastics Corp., the Court decided, among other things,
that a no-strike clause similar in breadth to the language of the no
strike clause in Rockaway New was not violated when employees
struck in protest of the company's unfair labor practices. 1I5 The
Court found the no-strike provisions of the contract to be
aimed at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts
to change existing economic relationships . . . .
To adopt petitioners' all-inclusive interpretation of the clause is
quite a different matter. That interpretation would eliminate, for
the whole year, the employees' right to strike even if petitioners, by
coercion, ousted the employees' lawful bargaining representatives
and, by threats of discharge, caused the employees to sign member
ship cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the legality of
such a waiver when explicitly stated, there is no adequate basis for
implying its existence without a more compelling expression of it
then appears in § 5 of this contract. I 16

The Court further determined that the contract must be read in
light of the declared policy of the NLRA to balance a competitive
business economy against the rights of labor to organize in an effort to
better its conditions through the process of collective bargaining. 117
Based on this policy, the Court determined that waivers of employee
rights to strike, such as contained in the no-strike provisions of the
contract in question, could only contribute to the policies of the Act
"provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 76-77,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2434-35.
Id. at 78-79,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436.
Id. at 81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436.
350 U.S. at 284, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2593.
Id. at 282-83, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2592.
Id. at 279, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 259\.
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free."118 Allowing the company to engage in unfair labor practices
which prevented the free selection of the employees' bargaining repre
sentative without allowing employees the right to engage in a retalia
tory strike would present a degree of imbalance which the Act did not
anticipate. For these reasons, the Court would not imply a waiver of
the employees' right to strike in protest of the employer's unfair labor
practice. 119
Rockaway News and Mastro Plastics Corp. remain the only
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court has actually interpreted
the scope of broad no-strike language. There is, however, another line
of cases which has dramatically impacted on the interpretation of ex
press no-strike language. In 1962 the Court decided Local 174, Team
sters v. Lucas Flour CO.,120 a case in which the Court was asked to
determine whether a strike called by the union violated the collective
bargaining agreement,. notwithstanding the absence of a no-strike ..
clause. 121 The strike in Lucas Flour was called to protest the com
pany's discharge of an employee because of unsatisfactory work. 122
The collective bargaining agreement between the company and the
employer did not contain an express no-strike clause, but did include
an agreement to submit to binding arbitration "any difference as to the
true interpretation of this agreement."123 The Court held that the
duty to submit contractual disputes to final and binding arbitration
implied a no-strike agreement covering issues to be decided by the
contractual arbitration process. 124
The Court further defined the rule of Lucas Flour in Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers ofAmerica. 125 Here again the Court
was faced with a contract containing an agreement to submit contract
disputes to binding arbitration, but not an express no-strike agree
ment. 126 The Court, relying on its previous decision in Lucas Flour,
implied a no-strike obligation resulting from an agreement to arbitrate
contractual disputes. 127 In limiting this implied obligation the Court
stated that, where there is an arbitration agreement and no express
negation of an implied no-strike obligation, "the agreement to arbi
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.

Jd. at 280, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2591.
Jd. at 284, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2593.

369 U.S. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962).
at 106,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2722.
at 97, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2718.
at 96, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2718.
at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721.
414 U.S. 368, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049 (1974).
Jd. at 381-82, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2054.
Jd. at 382, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2055.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
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trate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having cotermi
nous application."128 The Court also identified a limited exception to
the implied no-strike obligation in those cases in which the strike re
sulted from a good faith fear of abnormally dangerous conditions in
the workplace. 129
The final cog in developing an understanding of recent judicial
interpretations of express no-strike provisions is derived from the
Supreme Court's decisions in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Lo
cal 770,130 Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, \31 and Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals v. ILA.132 In Boys Markets, the Court reexamined its deci
sion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, \33 finding that the anti-in
junction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 134 did not preclude
the courts from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation
under a collective bargaining agreement. \3S The Court, however, indi
cated that its holding was a narrow one and that to properly grant
injunctive relief against strike activity a court must first hold that the
strike "is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound
to arbitrate. . . and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a
condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike."136 The
Court also added that the employer must prove that an injunction
would be warranted under the following ordinary principles of equity:
contract breaches are occurring and will continue to occur, or have
been threatened and will be committed; that such breaches have or
will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and that the employer
will suffer more injury if the injunction is denied than the union will
suffer through its granting. \37
The limitations of the Boys Markets exception are shown by the
Court's subsequent decisions in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers 138
and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA.139 In Buffalo Forge, the
Court indicated that the Boys Markets exception does not apply in
128. Id. at 385-86, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2056.
129. Id. at 381-82, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2054-55.
130. 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257 (1970).
131. 428 U.S. 397,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032 (1976).
132. 457 U.S. 702, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2665 (1982).
133. 370 U.S. 195, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2420 (1962).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
135. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 253, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
136. 398 U.S. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 37 U.S. 195, 228, 50 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2420, 2433 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting».
137. Id. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
138. 428 U.S. 397, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032 (1976).
139. 457 U.S. 702, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2665 (1982).
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cases of sympathy strikes because the underlying dispute between the
union and the employer is not subject to the arbitration provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement. l40 The Court reasoned that the
real issue underlying the sympathy strike was the union's desire to
support another union's cause, not the union's contention that the em
ployer had violated some provision in its collective bargaining agree
ment. 141 Since the reason for the strike was a dispute between the
employer and union "B," the dispute could not be solved by arbitra
tion between the employer and union "A" and, therefore, an injunc
tion was not necessary to protect the arbitral process. 142
In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the Court applied the same ra
tionale to prohibit the issuance of an injunction to stop a strike called
as a political protest to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. 143
Since the dispute underlying the. strike was not an issue between the
union and the employer, and therefore not arbitrable under the con
tract, no injunction to stop the strike could be granted. l44
In both Buffalo Forge and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the col
lective bargaining agreements contained express no-strike clauses. 14s
The Court indicated that whether a union's actions violated such
clauses was an arbitrable question. 146 Subsequent to an arbitration de
cision finding the union's activities to be a contract violation, a court
140. 428 U.S. at 407-08, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3036.
141. Id. at 407, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3036.
142. Id. at 410, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3037.
143. 457 U.S. at 704-05, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2665-66.
144. 457 U.S. at 721-22, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2672-73.
145. The Buffalo Forge no-strike clause reads:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of work.
No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or con
done any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activity. The
Union recognizes its possible liabilities for violation of this provision and will use
its influence to see that work stoppages are prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by
Union officers or Union representatives to prevent and terminate conduct prohib
ited by this paragraph, will not be construed as "aid" or "condonation" of such
conduct and shall not result in any disciplinary actions against the Officers, com
mitteemen or stewards involved.
428 U.S. at 398 n.l, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3033 n.1. The Jacksonville no-strike clause
reads:
During the term of this Agreement: . . . the Union agrees there shall not be any
strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, . . . for any cause whatsoever; such
causes including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the Employer or
violation of this Agreement. The right of employees not to cross a bona fide
picket line is recognized by the Employer. . . .
457 U.S. at 706, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2666.
146. Jackson Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 710-11, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2668;
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 410, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3047.
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could grant lDJunctive relief to enforce the arbitrator's award, but
since the arbitrator's award would not settle the underlying reason for
the strike, an injunction was not necessary "to implement the strong
Congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mecha
nisms agreed upon by the parties."147
In neither of these cases, however, was the Court forced to inter
pret the no-strike provisions of the contracts. In Boys Markets, the
contract violation was conceded by the parties l48 and in Buffalo Forge
and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the Court's holding obviated the ne
cessity to interpret the applicable no-strike provisions. 149
As previously indicated, the Board began to apply the cotermi
nous application doctrine of Lucas Flour to interpret express no-strike
obligations holding that, regardless of the circumstances, the no-strike
pledge was no broader than the arbitration clause of the contract. 150
This left the circuit courts with the problem of evaluating the Board's
broad application of the Supreme Court's doctrine.
In early decisions, it appeared that the courts might be accepting
the Board's extension of the doctrine to cases involving express no
strike clauses. In Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB,151 the Seventh
Circuit enforced an order of the Board which found that a union's
sympathy strike activity did not violate the no-strike obligation con
tained in that contract, stating: "Absent an explicit expression of such
[other] intention . . . the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to
strike should be construed as having coterminous application."152 The
court then cited the no-strike/arbitration clauses and reasoned: "This
language indicates an intention to treat the no-strike clause as having
application co-extensively with that of the arbitration clause. That ap
plication is to 'any and all disputes and controversies arising under or
in connection with the terms of provisions' of the bargaining agree
ment."153 From these statements, it is not clear whether the court
was holding that no-strike clauses were limited by the scope of the
arbitration clause as a matter of law or because of the specific language
of the contract in question.
147. Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3036.
148. 398 U.S. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264.
149. Jackson Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 722-24, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2672-73;
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 409-12, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3037-38.
150. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
151. 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
925, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975).
152. [d. at 287, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2832 (citing Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at
382, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2055).
153. Id. at 288, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2832.
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The court, however, did not leave this question open for long. In
NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 154 another case involving the legitimacy
of a sympathy strike in light of an express no-strike provision in the
contract, the court reviewed its opinions in Gary-Hobart and Hyster
Co. v. Independent Towing and Lifting Machine Association,155 and
stated:
We should not, however, read the language of judicial opinions
without regard to the factual circumstances of the litigation in
which it appears or to the analytic framework in which the language
is used . . . .
Further, the Hyster opinion focused on the lack of a clear and
unmistakable waiver, summarizing the holding of Gary-Hobart as
establishing such a waiver as an essential prerequisite to the denial
of employees' right to honor a stranger union's picket line. Yet the
Gary Hobart holding depends in turn upon the factual circum
stances of that controversy . . . . 156

The Keller-Crescent court then looked to the specific facts of that case
and refused to enforce the Board's order, finding a waiver of the right
to sympathize even though there was no specific language prohibiting
such strikes in the contract.1 57
Completing the Seventh Circuit picture is its recent decision in
u.s. Steel Corp. v. NLRB.158 In U.S. Steel, the court specifically deals
with, and rejects, the Board's broad application of the coterminous
application doctrine:
In the Board's view . . . any waiver of the right to engage in a
sympathy strike may be found only "in express contractual lan
guage or in unequivocal extrinsic evidence bearing upon ambiguous
contractual language." The Board's position is predicated upon the
doctrine of coterminous application. . . . The doctrine, originating
in the construction of contracts that were devoid of any express no
strike pledge, . . . means nothing more than that a court will not
154. 538 F.2d 1291,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976).
155. 519 F.2d 89, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2885, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). The
Hyster court refused to apply the Boys Market anti-injunction exception (see supra notes
133-149 and accompanying text) to allow injunctive relief from sympathy strike activity.
The contract contained a broad no-strike clause but the court determined that the dispute
was not over a grievance arbitrable under the contract, therefore, no injunction could be
issued. Id. at 93, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2887. The court further indicated that the no
strike language did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to engage in
a sympathy strike, as required under Gary-Hobart. Id.
156. 538 F.2d at 1299,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3597.
157. Id. at 1298, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3596.
158. 711 F.2d 772, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir. 1983).
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imply a no-strike obligation broader than the arbitration clause
from which it emanates. . . . The doctrine of coterminous applica
tion may also be invoked with respect to contracts containing an
express no-strike clause when injunctive relief is sought for a viola
tion of the no-strike obligation. . . .
Of course, in cases when an arbitration clause and an express
no-strike clause are closely interwoven, it may be reasonable to infer
that the parties intended the two provisions to have the same scope

159

The U. S. Steel court decided the broad no-strike language of that
contract prohibited sympathy strikes, finding the Board's coterminous
application doctrine inapplicable to the interpretation of explicit no
strike clauses which are "functionally independent from the arbitra
tion clause of the contract."160 The court also found that, since no
injunctive relief was being sought, the limitations of Boys Market and
Buffalo Forge did not apply.161
A similar analysis was made by the Sixth Circuit in its recent en
banc decision in Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union
480. 162 In Ryder Truck, the court was dealing with an action filed by
the employer under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act 163 claiming breach of the contract's express no-strike commit
ment. l64 The district court awarded damages to the employer but was
reversed by a panel of the circuit court, which held that the no-strike
clause prohibited strikes only over arbitrable disputes. 165 In the cir
cuit's en banc decision, it traced the history of the coterminous appli
cation doctrine, finding that it originated in decisions interpreting
contracts which contained an arbitration clause but not an explicit no
strike obligation and had also been applied in the context of the Boys
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act'sl66 anti-injunction
provisions. 167
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the decisions of
Boys Markets, Buffalo Forge, and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, finding
support for its opinion that the coterminous application doctrine "ap
plies only to determining the permissibility of enjoining strikes and not
159. Id. at 776-77, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3230-31 (footnotes omitted).
160. Id. at 777-78, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3231.
161. [d. at 777, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3231.
162. 727 F.2d 594, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912 (6th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
163. 29 U.S.c. § 185 (1976).
164. 727 F.2d at 600, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2917.
165. [d. at 595, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2912.
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
167. 727 F.2d at 598, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2915.
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to determining the scope of an explicit no-strike clause." 168 The key to
the court's reasoning was the Supreme Court's conclusion in Jackson
ville Bulk Terminals that the issue of whether the strike violated the
explicit no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agree
ment was a separate question from whether the strike was enjoin
able. 169 Based on this .,;easoning, and citing the Seventh Circuit's U.S.
Steel decision,170 tiie Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of cotermi
nous application was inapplicable to cases requiring the interpretation
of express no-strike provisions. 171

v.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

The history of interpreting no-strike agreements started with little
conflict or complexity. Early arbitral decisions presaged later Board
and judicial opinions by implying no-strike agreements into contracts
that contained binding arbitration clauses, using the plain meaning of
the written language to interpret express no-strike provisions and re
fusing to sanction illegitimate union use of picket lines. l72
The courts and the Board also seemed to have little trouble when
initially faced with the question of how to interpret broad no-strike
language. When such obligations were created by express contract
language separate from the arbitration provisions of the collective bar
gaining agreement, the no-strike obligation was interpreted to prohibit
all work stoppages except those in protest of the unlawful conduct of
the employer. 173
For twenty-one years after the Supreme Court's decision in Rock
away News, the NLRB interpreted broad no-strike language to include
168. Id. at 599, 1\5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916.
169. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 721-22, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2672
73. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the Supreme Court's holding in Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals was wholly inconsistent with the "contention that under the doctrine of cotermi
nous interpretation an express no-strike clause does not prohibit a strike over a nonarbitra
b1e dispute. The Court's holding does illustrate, however, that where there is an express
no-strike clause, strikes are enjoinable only if over an arbitrable matter." Ryder Truck, 727
F.2d at 598, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916.
170. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772,113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir.
1983).
171. 727 F.2d at 599,115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916-17.
172. See supra notes 16-49 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587
(Supreme Court affirmed the enforcement of a Board order indicating that unfair labor
practice strikes are not prohibited by general no-strike language); Rockaway News Supply
Co., 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (Supreme Court found a sympathy strike to be
prohibited by broad no-strike language); National Grinding Wheel Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 628,
71 L.R.R.M. 1311 (BNA) (Board found broad no-strike language to prohibit sympathy
strikes).
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a prohibition of sympathy strikes. 174 It was not until the mid-1970s1 75
that the Board began to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of
broad no-strike language, relying upon Supreme Court decisions in
cases where the Court was dealing not with the interpretation of con
tractual provisions, but with (1) the scope of anti-injunction legisla
tion 176 or (2) the situations in which an express no-strike obligation
was not found in the contract, but a limited no-strike obligation was
nonetheless implied by the Court as a result of the parties' agreement
to settle contractual disputes through binding arbitration processes. 177
At this point, the Board's interpretation seems to have gone
astray. The coterminous application doctrine, relied upon by the
Board in fashioning its recent interpretations of no-strike provisions,
was developed by the Court to protect the arbitral process from the
erosive effect of allowing unions to substitute the economic pressure of
strikes for arbitration. 178 To allow unions the option of striking to
enforce their contractual views would render any agreement to arbi
trate disputes meaningless and, contrary to the stated policy of the
NLRA, would increase industrial strife. 179
In rejecting what the courts feel is an inappropriate use of the
coterminous application doctrine by the Board, the circuits look to
extrinsic factors to determine whether the union has, through the no
strike clause, clearly and unmistakably waived the employee's right to
engage in a sympathy strike. The circuits consider such factors as
whether the no-strike clause is functionally independent of the arbitra
tion clause; 180 whether the no-strike clause is a quid pro quo not
merely for the arbitration clause, but also to achieve uninterrupted
plant operation; 181 the intent of the parties as expressed by the con
174. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201
(1975), enforcement denied, 538 F.2d 1291, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976);
Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1210 (1974), enforced,
511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925, 90
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975).
176. 'See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032
(1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257
(1970).
177. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 85
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049 (1974); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 49
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962).
178. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 777-78, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227,
3231 (7th Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 778-79,113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3232.
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tract language read as a whole; 182 the law relating to the contract
when the no-strike agreement was made;183 the bargaining history of
the clause; 184 opinions concerning the scope of the no-strike clause ex
pressed by union officials;185 and any other relevant conduct of the
parties which shows their understanding of the contract. 186
The court's factors represent logical questions to ask if one were
trying to unravel a complex or ambiguous provision governing the
conduct of parties to a contract. The question remains, however, why
such inquiries are necessary to interpret language which provides that
"the union shall not collectively, concertedly or individually engage in
or participate, directly or indirectly, in any strike, slowdown, stop
page, or any other interference with or interruption of the work or
operations of the employer during the term of this agreement."187
This language is clear, uncomplex, and with no limitation prohibits job
actions of any sort during the term of the agreement. This language is
not only unambiguous, it is repeatedly umambiguous, expressly
prohibiting any strike, slowdown, stoppage, or any other interference
with the employer's operation. Not even the most tortuous distortion
of the English language would define this provision to be anything but
an all-inclusive agreement not to refuse to work, regardless of the
circumstances.
The astute practitioner, however, will disregard his or her dic
tionary when confronted with the necessity of interpreting express no
strike provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. Depending
upon the forum in which one is proceeding, the results of a case will
vary markedly. While the NLRB is by far more likely than arbitrators
or the courts to allow employees to strike even in the face of express
no-strike language, it is important to note that the Board's posture
with respect to such issues is prone to change. 188 Given this Board's
182. Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594, 600,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912,2917 (6th Cir. 1984).
183. Id.
184. NLRB v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1366, 107 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2667, 2675 (9th Cir. 1981).
185. Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 459, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2817,
2819-20 (3d Cir. 1981).
186. Amcar Div., A.C.F. Indus. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 567, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2518,2522 (8th Cir. 1981).
187. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
188. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether NLRB decisions are
more appropriately characterized as "labor law" or "labor policy." It is, however, impor
tant to note that the current Board's posture with respect to the no-strike clause changed
during the drafting of this article. See Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 118 L.R.R.M. 1201
(BNA) (1951) in which the Board concludes:
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willingness to reexamine and overturn previous Board positions,189 it
is not surprising that the coterminous application doctrine has been
successfully narrowed. 190
Even if we accept the situation that strikes in protest of an em
ployer's unfair labor practices are not prohibited by such language, it
is difficult to understand why sympathy strikes should likewise be ex
cluded. In unfair labor practice cases the employer enters the dispute
with "unclean hands" and is hardly, if you will excuse the expression,
a sympathetic figure. In the case of sympathy strikes, however, the
employer is not only innocent of any wrongdoing, the very nature of
the activity indicates that the dispute causing the strike is not caused
by any actions of the employer toward the striking employees. Fur
ther, allowing such strikes, especially in the face of express no-strike
obligations, is in direct conflict with the stated policy of the Act to
prevent industrial strife. 191 Finally, logic dictates that any organiza
tion which has given up the right to act on its own behalf must surely
have given up the lesser right of acting on the behalf of others.
Unfortunately, this "logic" has not been the deciding factor in
many recent interpretations of no-strike language. Despite the recent
no-strike position assumed by the Board, the labor attorney should
advise clients to seek an express statement banning not only all strikes,
but also all sympathy strikes. Absent such language, only overwhelm
ing extrinsic evidence can be relied upon to protect employers from
needless economic hardship.

that the broad no-strike clause bar employees from honoring stranger picket lines
. . . . Although previous Board decisions have held that sympathy strikes lie
outside the scope of broad no-strike clauses, we can discern no logical or practical
basis for the proposition that the prohibition of all "strikes" does not include
sympathy strikes merely because the word "sympathy" is not used.
Id. at 1201.
189. See, e.g., United Technologies, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, liS L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1281 (1984) and Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (1984).
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
191. 29 U.S.C. § lSI (1982). See also policy statement of29 U.S.c. § 141(b) (1982).

